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The  empirical  evidence  from  the  econometrics  of  self-reported  job 
satisfaction  and  from  organisational  psychology  on  job  performance 
confronts economic theory with some puzzling results. Job performance is 
found to be positively correlated with job satisfaction, whereas effort is 
assumed to be a disutility in the theory. Economic incentives are not found 
to be the main motivations of job performance; in some cases, indeed, they 
are even counterproductive. Interest in the job is found to account better for 
job satisfaction. This paper proposes an integrated approach to these issues 
by  (i)  conducting  an  interdisciplinary  critical  survey,  (ii)  proposing  a 
simple economic framework within which to explain the puzzles. The key 
idea  behind this  framework is  that  intrinsic motivations  and self-esteem 
help explain both job satisfaction and job performance. The employer can 
thus  adopt  other,  more  friendly  actions,  besides  using  incentives  and 
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0.  Introduction 
 
Workers’ performance and satisfaction on the job is studied by different lines of 
inquiry and in different disciplines. However, cross-referencing is occasional, and the 
results are not always consistent. In particular, empirical studies on job performance and 
satisfaction produce results puzzling for economic theory, which instead concentrates on 
workers’ job effort and utility. In fact, job satisfaction has recently attracted increasing 
attention  from  applied  economists,  mainly  because  the  self-reported  data  have  been 
validated by a number of tests.
1 The evidence yielded by this line of inquiry is puzzling 
because  monetary  compensation  and  incentives  for  job  effort  do  not  prove  to  be  of 
primary importance for job satisfaction in cross-section studies, whereas interest in the 
job  does  so.  In  time-series  analysis,  job  satisfaction  does  not  increase;  or  it  even 
decreases in some developed countries, despite their overall economic growth.
2 
Research  in  experimental  psychology  yields  another  puzzling  result:  material 
incentives often appear to have perverse effects on task performance. According to this 
research, these effects are due to the fact that extrinsic motivations for an external reward 
are able to crowd out intrinsic motivation, which is the pursuit of enjoyment by doing an 
activity for its own sake. Also these results have attracted interest from economists, who 
have  found  some  confirmation  for  them  in  the  workplace  (Frey  1997;  Weibel  et  al. 
2007). 
Other empirical studies in psychology and economics have found that workers’ 
job performance, often measured by their supervisors’ evaluations, is positively related to 
job satisfaction, although the correlation does not appear very close. In particular, some 
psychologists  show  that  if  satisfaction  regards  workers’  lives  as  a  whole,  then  job 
performance is positively and closely correlated with it. Instead, according to economic 
theory,  workers  extract  utility,  which  can  proxy  satisfaction,  from  the  economic 
incentives provided by firms in exchange for work effort, which is a disutility for the 
workers, but profitable for firms. 
                                                 
1 Validation has been empirically provided in the case of satisfaction with life as a whole and happiness 
(Clark et al. 2007; Kesebir & Diener 2008; and Konow & Earley 2003). 
2 This lack of correlation between job satisfaction and monetary compensation is a particular version of the 
so-called Easterlin paradox, which concerns happiness and per-capita income (Frey 2008; Layard 2005; 
Bruni & Porta 2005).   3 
Hence a comprehensive analysis of the different lines of inquiry pursued, and of 
the contributions made by the various disciplines involved, would be fruitful. This paper 
attempts  to  take  a  step  forward  in  this  direction  by  conducting  an  interdisciplinary 
survey, so as to highlight and evaluate the above-mentioned puzzles, and by proposing a 
simple economic framework within which to explain them. 
The endeavour to explain the positive but not-very-close correlation between job 
satisfaction and job performance, by considering the roles of economic incentives among 
other factors, suggests that two independent lines of argument should be followed. In the 
first it is argued that job performance causes job satisfaction. The individual – according 
to  organisational  psychologists  and  some  authoritative  economists  –  earns  a  psychic 
reward from work which may offset the disutility deriving from work effort. The second 
line of argument conversely links job satisfaction with job performance by introducing 
happiness  as  a  mediating  variable,  since  happiness  both  synthesises  the  various  life 
domain satisfactions and affects overall performance. 
The paper therefore attempts to integrate the literature on job satisfaction with 
that  on  job  performance,  and  the  economic  literature  with  that  of  organisational 
psychology. However, it also conducts a survey intended to indicate possible solutions 
for the problem raised, rather than for providing a complete list of references on the 
topic. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 illustrates the main issues raised by a 
cross-survey of the literature; Section 2 is devoted to the growing econometric literature 
on  job  satisfaction;  Section  3  considers  the  results  of  research,  both  economic  and 
psychological, on job performance; Section 4 concentrates on the evidence concerning 
the link between job performance and job satisfaction, while Section 5 concentrates on 
the evidence for the reverse link from job satisfaction to job performance; and Section 6 
provides an economic framework for an integrated analysis. Brief remarks conclude the 
paper  in  Section  7,  while  the  Appendix  contains  a  synoptic  table  of  the  empirical 
references. 
   4 
1.  Setting the issues 
 
There  is  an  abundance  of  empirical  studies  on  job  performance  and  job 
satisfaction  in  the  economic  and  organisational  psychology  literature.  They  adopt 
different methods and very different datasets;
3 they often focus on either job performance 
or job satisfaction, and they sometimes extend their analysis to several other aspects as 
well. A synthetic scheme with  which to  organise individual studies  around  the main 
issues would thus be useful. 
The  following  flow-chart  will  be  referred  to  throughout  the  paper.  The  key 
variables usually considered in studies are represented by means of symbols in boxes, 
and  the  links  by  means  of  arrows  ()  between  them.  The  presumed  causation  is 
represented by the direction of the arrows with an implicit positive sign if not otherwise 
marked (see Fig. 1). The representation depicts an individual working in a job as an 
employee. 
The symbols and their meanings can be listed thus: 
Y  =  contractual  income,  inclusive  of  labour  compensation  and  specific  economic 
incentives like promotions and fringe benefits; 
P = performance on the job; 
PI = effort, including fatigue and stress, i.e. job performance as input to work; 
PO = achievements, productivity, i.e. job performance as output from work; 
W = job satisfaction, which is usually, but not necessarily, self-reported; 
U = utility; 
S = reward based on identity or self-esteem; 
H = overall life satisfaction and happiness; 
X = extra-job determinants of happiness, including trait-like characteristics; 
Z = extra-economic variables, specifically: 
Zj = job characteristics, 
Zi = individual characteristics. 
                                                 
3 For information on sampling and on the datasets used in the most recent works cited, see the Appendix.   5 
Fig. 1. Key variables and key relationships 
 
Examination  of  the  different  strands  of  research  on  job  performance  and  job 
satisfaction  highlights  some  key  issues  regarding  the  relationships  among  the  above 
variables. These issues can be specified thus: 
I)  The relationship between economic conditions and job satisfaction (YW), 
with respect to the relationship with it of other extra-economic and context 
variables (ZW). 
(I.1) Is the relationship between Y and W significant, relevant, and robust in 
both time series and cross-sectional studies?  
(I.2) What other factors, whether characteristics of the job (Zj) or individual 
characteristics (Zi), emerge as important in relation to W? 
Economic theory would predict that the relationship YU, which determines 
YW, is positive and important, while leaving a minor systematic role to the 
other  extra-economic  and  contextual  variables.  The  empirical  literature 
challenges these predictions. 
II)  The relationship between economic conditions and job performance (YP), 
with respect to the relationship with it of other extra-economic and context 
variables (ZP). 
(II.1) What is the significance and relevance of the relationship between Y 
and P?    6 
(II.2) Is the relationship between Y and P positive, or it may be negative? 
(II.3) What other factors, whether characteristics of the job (Zj) or individual 
characteristics (Zi), emerge as important in relation to P? 
Psychology studies report the puzzling result that the sign of the relationship 
between Y and P may be negative, and they explain this result as being due to 
the crowding-out of intrinsic motivations on the job by extrinsic motivations, 
like pay-for-performance. Z-factors seem to play a key role in this effect. 
III)  The relationship between job performance and job satisfaction: PW. 
(III.1)  Which  is  the  sign,  the  significance,  and  the  relevance  of  the 
relationship?  Economics  (e.g.  agency  and  efficiency  wage  theories) 
assumes that the sign is negative, since PIUW, where PIU is a 
negative  link,  and  where  UW  and  PIPO  are  positive  and  implicit 
links. Organisational psychology usually finds a positive sign. 
(III.2) Which is the direction of the causality? Is it a direct or a mediated 
causality? The argument for P as causing W is that achievements give a 
sense of satisfaction, and even a good mood. The argument for the reverse 
causation  of  W  on  P  is  that  a  sense  of  well-being  produces  greater 
concentration and perseverance. 
The literature comprises two independent lines of research for dealing with 
these issues. The first argues that P causes W through two links, but with 
opposite sign, as represented in Fig. 1. In the second line it is argued that W 
causes P through the mediation of H. 
These issues are interrelated, and it is unusual for one issue to be studied at a 
time, or as the main focus of analysis. The literature on the matter is therefore wide-
ranging,  interdisciplinary,  and  articulated  into  various  lines  of inquiry. Consequently, 
when the empirical results are presented below, the concern will be more to organise 
them clearly according to the above scheme than to provide a detailed and complete 
account of the existing literature. 
Sections  2  and  3  will  examine  the  results  from  the  literature  which  aid 
understanding of issues (I) and (II), whilst Sections 4 and 5 concentrate on two different 
perspectives that emerge from the literature and appear useful for resolving issue (III). A 
unitary framework for the analysis is set out in Section 6.   7 
In  conclusion of this Section, a note of caution is in order. The above figure 
contains  arrows  indicating  causation.  However,  one  of  the  major  weaknesses  of  this 
literature  in  its  entirety  regards  precisely  the  evidence  on  causation,  rather  than  on 
correlation.  It  will  therefore  be  preferable  to  speak  in  what  follows  of  ‘presumed 
causation’ or ‘presumed effects’. This presumption is entailed by the large use made of 
controls in the regressions, and on the great quantity and variety of studies examined, but 
a great deal of research is needed on this aspect.  
 
2.  Econometric research on job satisfaction (Y,ZW) 
 
Job satisfaction has been defined as the "positive emotional state resulting from 
the  appraisal  of  one's  job"  (Locke,  1976:1300).  Research  on  job  satisfaction  usually 
adopts  self-reported  data,
4  and  it  has  rapidly  developed  in  connection  with  so-called 
‘happiness economics’. The methodology of research varies to some extent. Economists 
usually  prefer  datasets  of  large  size,  with  samples  of  thousands  and  even  tens  of 
thousands of individuals. They refer to countries as a whole, usually developed countries, 
or  to  sectors,  or  to  groups  of  firms.  Statistical  elaboration  can  thus  be  rather 
sophisticated,  and  econometrics  is  the  standard  method  used.  Psychologists  usually 
construct their own databases, and prefer to work with several and deep-lying dimensions 
of  concepts,  such  as  job  satisfaction,  and  they  concentrate  on  capturing  the  best 
psychological indices for them. This restricts the empirical analysis to relatively small 
samples. However, meta-analysis, which is a statistical analysis of the results of a body 
of studies in the literature, is also used in psychology. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Job satisfaction has also been questioned as an economic construct, being instead interpreted as a proxy 
for the intention to be absent from work, and to quit (Freeman 1978), with obvious negative effects on 
turnover (Griffeth et al. 2000), and absenteeism (Breaugh 1981; Wegge et al. 2007). See also (Carsten & 
Spector, 1987; Brook & Price, 1989; Pierce et al., 1991; Tett & Meyer, 1993; Eby et al., 1999). Borzaga & 
Tortia (2006) use, as the dependent variable in regressions, both self-reported satisfaction and a variable 
drawn from a question on “desire to stay with the current organisation”, and they obtain similar results. A 
specific  study  on  the  reliability  of  the  self-reported  job  satisfaction  measure  shows  positive  results 
(Kristensen & Westrgaard-Nielsen 2008).   8 
2.1 The dynamic of job satisfaction over time 
Over past decades, economic growth and technological progress have ameliorated 
the economic conditions of workers and the material conditions of their workplaces, on 
average.  However,  some  studies  on  a  country  basis  show  that  job  satisfaction  has 
recently decreased in some rich countries, and is presumably stable in others. This is 
what emerges in the US (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1999), in Germany (Sousa-Poza & 
Sousa-Poza, 2000), and also in the UK (Green & Tsitsianis, 2005), at least since the 
1970s, and most of the OECD countries during the 1990s (Clark, 2005). For the other 
countries the data available are restricted to around six years and show stability (Green & 
Tsitsianis, 2005).
5 The opposite dynamic of job satisfaction with respect to the economic 
conditions as represented by wages, and to job conditions as represented by working 
time, is also evident (Clark, 2005). 
A test for reliability of self-reported data over time has been conducted by Green 
and Gallie (2002), who use both data of this kind and an epidemiological measure of 
affective well-being based on two coordinates – enthusiasm-depression and contentment-
anxiety – obtaining very similar results in their regression exercises. 
If job satisfaction decreases or remains stable despite overall economic growth, 
some other factors may account for the phenomenon. First, increasing inequality in some 
job  characteristics,  principally  in  the  different  treatment  of  some  classes  of  workers, 
appears to be a significant factor. Specifically, job satisfaction has particularly decreased 
for older (aged over 45) and less-educated workers, while it has somewhat increased for 
young  and  highly-educated  people  (Clark,  2005).  Secondly,  job  insecurity,  work 
intensity, greater stress, and dissatisfaction with working hours have increased in the US 
and in Germany, and they significantly explain the decline of job satisfaction (Green & 
Tsitsianis 2005; Blanchflower & Oswald 1999). However, the puzzle of a divergent trend 
of  job  satisfaction  with  respect  to  economic  growth  partially  remains,  because  these 
studies  also  show  that  the  explanatory  contribution  of  all  the  deteriorating  factors 




                                                 
5 Green & Tsitsianis (2005) also show that the decline persists even when controlling for the cohort effect, 
and for the cyclical effect.   9 
2.2 Cross-sectional evidence on job satisfaction and economic conditions 
The  happiness  literature  has  found  that  per-capita  income  and  happiness  are 
positively  related  for  the  cross-section  of  countries,  despite  the  declining  trend  of 
happiness  in  the  US  (Stevenson  &  Wolfers  2008).  Similarly,  the  literature  on  job 
satisfaction finds that workers’ compensation and job satisfaction are positively related 
for the cross-section of countries. For example, Skalli et al. (2007) and Sousa-Poza & 
Sousa-Poza (2000) show that workers in East-European countries appear to be the least 
satisfied  on  the  job,  while  ones  in  Mediterranean  countries  occupy  an  intermediate 
position. In particular, the US is very well placed in the ranking, while Italy is placed in a 
rather low position (see also Blanchflower & Oswald, 1999).
6  
Other studies confirm this result. Diaz-Serrano & Cabral Vieira (2005) show that 
low-pay  workers  are  likely  to  have  low-quality  jobs,  and  consequently  less  job 
satisfaction.  Siebern-Thomas’s  (2005)  cross-sectional  analysis  on  the  European 
Community  Household  Panel  shows  that  the  correlation  between  wage  and  job 
satisfaction is significant and positive. Brown & McIntosh (1998) have found evidence 
that the correlation between wage and job satisfaction is particularly close in the case of 
low  levels  of  monetary  compensation,  both  within  the  sector  and  among  sectors.  A 
different  result  is  obtained  by  Leontaridi  &  Sloane  (2001),  who  show  that  low-pay 
workers report higher job satisfaction than do other workers. 
But the striking finding of studies of this kind is that monetary compensation is 
not  the  most  important  determinant  of  job  satisfaction.  According  to  Sousa-Poza  & 
Sousa-Poza (2000), monetary compensation ranks fourth as a positive determinant of job 
satisfaction at country level; according to Skalli et al. (2007) it ranks second, but with a 
coefficient halved with respect to the first determinant; according to Helliwell & Huang 
(2005)  personal  income  ranks  sixth  among  non-socio-demographic  determinants.  For 
Clark (2005), the importance of having a high wage is at the bottom of the list of job 
values, since other aspects (from job security to having an interesting job, from work 
independency to social usefulness, etc.) come first.
7 Furthermore, placing most value on 
pay at work is negatively correlated with job satisfaction (see also Clark 1997). 
                                                 
6 This ranking is similar to that for happiness. See in particular the bad conditions of Italy in Blanchflower 
& Oswald’s (2007) objective evidence on mental health with respect to the other countries. 
7 Clark (2005) also observes that monetary compensation is especially important in the Mediterranean 
countries, which are the poorest in its sample.   10 
Other  interesting  results  are  that  the  reference  group  income  is  negatively 
correlated  with  individual  job  satisfaction  (Cappelli  &  Sherer,  1988;  Clark,  1999), 
indicating the interference of psychological perceptions in the estimation of the personal 
well-being and the importance of relative income (as also found by Clark & Oswald, 
1996; Brown & McIntosh, 1998; Hammermesh, 2001). Clark (1999) shows that changes 
in workers’ pay over time positively influence their well-being, whereas the current level 
of pay does not impact on job satisfaction. Finally, a non-linearity between compensation 
and satisfaction may be conjectured. Helliwell & Huang (2005) find that the logarithm of 
income provides a better fit for satisfaction. Borzaga & Depedri (2005) observe that, 
even in a sector characterised by low average salaries like the social-services sector, 
employees are more satisfied when their wages increase up to a threshold, but not above 
that threshold. 
Satisfaction from monetary compensation also varies according to the sector. For 
example,  Benz  (2005)  finds  that  wages  for  for-profit  employees  would  have  to  be 
doubled (US) and tripled (UK) in order to make for-profit employees as satisfied as non-
profit workers, with a special premium for professional services. Similar results emerge 
for Italy (Tortia 2008; Borzaga & Tortia 2006).
8 
The  economic  conditions,  as  represented  by  Y  in  our  scheme,  include  other 
contractual  conditions  besides  current  monetary  compensation:  e.g.  promotions,  job 
security, training and professional growth. Despite the importance of tournaments and 
promotions in agency theory, they have been little studied in empirical analyses. Only 
Clark  (1997)  finds  that  promotion  opportunities  are  positively  correlated  with  job 
satisfaction,  but  he also  finds  that  valuing  promotion  the most  at work  is  negatively 
correlated with job satisfaction. 
Much more studied is job stability, which has been mainly investigated in regard 
to  the  effect  of  job  insecurity  on  job  satisfaction.  The  detrimental  impact  of 
unemployment has been shown by Clark (2005) on a regional basis. This effect is similar 
to that found in the happiness literature, where unemployment displays a negative effect 
on subjective well-being over and above the effect due to income loss (stigma effect). 
This suggests that job insecurity is not represented entirely by Y, but also partially by 
psychological components included in Z. 
                                                 
8 For the wage gap between these two sectors in Italy see Mosca et al. (2006).   11 
The role of a specific variable for job insecurity has been also found to have a 
significant negative effect on job satisfaction, but it is not one of great importance. The 
small though highly significant
9 size of the attached coefficient has been reported by 
Sousa-Poza  &  Sousa-Poza  (2000),  and  similar  results  have  been  obtained  by 
Blanchflower & Oswald (1999) through finer analysis of the insecurity variable.
10 In a 
study on job security guarantees, Bryson et al. (2004) find that job security positively 
impacts  only  on  pay  satisfaction,  not  on  other  measures  of  job  satisfaction,  such  as 
satisfaction with non-pecuniary aspects of the job and intensity of the job. A converging 
result has been found for temporary contract workers, who appear to be less satisfied 
with  their  jobs  than  employees  with  open-ended  contracts  (Siebern-Thomas,  2005; 
Kaiser, 2002).  
 
2.3 Characteristics of the job and job satisfaction 
Section  1  suggested  that  a  specific  focus  on  variables  other  than  those 
representing the economic conditions, i.e. Z-variables, is needed if job satisfaction is to 
be effectively explained. This subsection considers the group of variables representing 
the extra-economic characteristics of the job and of the workplace (i.e. ones not already 
included in Y), labelled with Zj. 
A striking finding in this regard is that an interesting job is considered by workers 
to be the greatest positive determinant of job satisfaction (Sousa-Poza & Sousa-Poza 
2000; Skalli et al. 2007), or one of the most important job characteristics (Clark, 2005; 
Helliwell & Huang, 2005).
11 The similar characteristic of ‘good job contents’ (by which 
is meant having an interesting job, useful for helping other people and society, and which 
makes the worker independent) has the largest impact on job satisfaction together with 
relations at work (Clark, 2005). Being interested in the job is also the most significant 
factor in the general definition given to the possible ‘commitment to type of work’ which 
emerges when workers are discouraged from leaving their jobs by the attractiveness of 
the  activity  performed.  In  particular,  empirical  studies  show  that  workers  (especially 
managers) are frequently committed more to their jobs than to their organizations, and 
                                                 
9 This is confirmed by Clark’s (1997) finding that valuing security the most at work is positively correlated 
with job satisfaction. 
10 This result is partially confirmed by temporal data, as mentioned in section 2.1. 
11 In Italy, this result seems especially important and even independent from the education level (Skalli et 
al. 2007).   12 
the former increases their job satisfaction much more than the latter (Stroh et al. 1994). 
This result may be explained by opportunities for cross-training and innovation which 
increase workers’ interest and curiosity.
12 Close to the notion of commitment to work is 
that of ‘psychological empowerment’. This has been conceived as “a tool to encourage 
workers to think for themselves about the requirements of the job, and to move beyond 
blindly  doing  what  they  are  told”  (Spence  Laschinger  et  al.  2004).  The  analysis  by 
Hechanova et al. (2006) of Filipino service workers shows, for  example, that all the 
factors  of psychological empowerment  —  meaning  of the job,  workers’  competence, 
autonomy or self-determination, and impact of the workers’ activity — significantly and 
positively impact on their job satisfaction. In manufacturing firms, however, innovations 
– evaluated in terms of training, organizational and technological innovations – appear to 
be neutral with respect to the degree of empowerment of workers, although it influences 
some aspects of their well-being (Antonioli et al., 2008).  
An aspect which has been particularly closely studied in the literature is workers’ 
involvement  in  the  organization,  also  understood  as  participation  by  subordinates.  In 
regard to job satisfaction, it has been found that the level of participation in the definition 
of managerial review processes appears to be a positive factor (Burke & Wilcox, 1969; 
Landy et al., 1980; Dipboye, 1985). Specifically, the more workers participate in the 
discussion of career issues and human resources policies, the greater is their satisfaction 
with work (Nathan et al., 1991). More recent surveys demonstrate that also participative 
management improves workers’ job satisfaction (Soonhee, 2002), and that the use by 
managers of a participative style in strategic planning is positively correlated with job 
satisfaction, especially when it is supported with clear communication and workers are 
held accountable for the consequences of their decisions (Thoms et al., 2002). This kind 
of policy seems to be effective not only in private organizations but also in public bodies 
(Brewer et al., 2000).  
Involvement in  the organization  can  be included in  the concept of procedural 
fairness, which is distinct from distributive fairness, as discussed immediately below. 
Specific studies on this distinction find that both kinds of fairness are important for job 
satisfaction (Tortia 2008; Valentini 2005; Green & Tsitsianis 2005). 
                                                 
12 However, when workers are strongly committed to the type of work, they also increase their criticisms of 
the job’s characteristics. As a consequence, job satisfaction decreases owing to the presence of some salient 
negative aspects of the job (Cavanaugh and Noe, 1999).   13 
The importance of perceived fairness of pay for job satisfaction has been studied 
in parallel with ‘relative income’ in the happiness literature. The result is undisputed, at 
least in its sign: the pay taken as the benchmark by workers is negatively correlated with 
their job satisfaction. Clark (1997) adds that, together with their own income, the effect 
still  remains  negative.  Green  &  Gallie  (2002)  confirm  the  marked  deterioration  of 
affective well-being  due  to  a lack  of  "fairness".  Charness  &  Haruvy  (1999) report a 
laboratory experiment which underlines the importance of agreement between employer 
and employees on the fair wage.  
A recent issue of interest in the economic literature on job satisfaction, and which 
is included in Z, is relatedness with supervisors, colleagues and customers. The result is 
as one would expect from personal experience, since relatedness in the workplace is 
important  for  job  satisfaction  (Clark  1997;  Borzaga  &  Depedri  2005).  While  Clark 
(1997)  finds  a  generic  importance,  Sousa-Poza  &  Sousa-Poza  (2000)  assert  that  the 
relationship with management is the third (positive) determinant of job satisfaction, and 
that it is far more important than the relationship with colleagues. A consistent result has 
been found by Antonioli et al. (2008). Borzaga & Depedri (2005) compare non-profit 
with for-profit firms, and conclude that relatedness may be conceived as a good that 
firms can effectively exchange for monetary compensation. A more specific study on 
altruism and job satisfaction shows a positive correlation between them, so that other-
oriented values may be also improved by organizations through their missions and social 
goals (Arciniega & Gonzales, 2005). Finally, Helliwell & Huang’s (2005) study on the 
role of social capital in the workplace finds that the relation between trust in management 
and job satisfaction is strongly significant and very substantial. 
Ambiguous  results  emerge  when  the  public  versus  private  sector  has  been 
considered by analyses of job satisfaction. Diaz-Serrano & Cabral Vieira (2005) find that 
workers are more satisfied in the public sector, whereas Ghinetti (2007) finds that the 
opposite is the case. The ambiguity seems to be due to the fact that public employees are 
more satisfied with job security, whilst private employees emphasise interest in the type 
of job. 
The importance of the social dimension on the job has been also underlined by 
studies  of  establishment  size:  working  in  larger  establishments  is  more  unpleasant 
because  of  the  more  impersonal  atmosphere  and  the  increased  division  of  labour   14 
(Masters, 1969). In fact, empirical surveys show that establishment size is negatively 
correlated with job satisfaction (“Overview: Small business optimism”, 1997; see also 
Clark, 1997). More precisely, Gazioglu & Tansel (2006) find that establishment size is 
negatively  correlated  more  with  the  specific  satisfaction  involving  a  sense  of 
achievement than with the other types of satisfaction, and Skalli et al. (2007) find that 
medium firm size, more than the large firm size, has a positive effect on the specific 
satisfaction with pay in Italy. Another explanation of the negative correlation between 
firm size and workers’ job satisfaction is that it is mainly due to a different process of 
workplace learning (Rowden, 2002). 
Interest in the job and networks within organisations may be also be responsible 
for the puzzling result of studies on the relationship between participation in trade unions 
and job satisfaction. In fact, less satisfied workers are expected to be involved in this type 
of activity, because they are attracted by this way of having a voice. However, this is 
confirmed by only a few works (see for example Schwochau, 1987), whereas Miller 
(1990) shows that belonging to a trade union is positively correlated with job satisfaction, 
perhaps because of aspirations, mobility strivings, and greater creativity, as suggested by 
Spinrad (1960). An explanation for these opposing results is offered by Bryson et al. 
(2005), who find that unionism in Great Britain negatively impacts on job satisfaction 
only when unions are recognised for bargaining purposes (endogenous recognition), but 
not when the membership is due to other factors. 
 
2.4. Characteristics of individuals and job satisfaction 
The second group of variables included in Z pertain to the characteristics of the 
individual (Zi). A characteristic of workers intriguing for the analysis of job satisfaction 
is gender. Many studies in fact show that women have a premium for being satisfied with 
their jobs (see e.g. Clark, 1997),
13 thus replicating a standard result in the happiness 
literature. Income and other conditions are usually controlled in regression analysis, but 
omitted variables capturing working conditions, which are usually relatively worse for 
women,  cannot  be  excluded.  This  case  thus  strengthens  the  puzzle.  Clark  (1997) 
proposes the explanation that women have fewer expectations than men regarding work. 
This hypothesis is confirmed for Australia by Long (2005), but it is rejected by Kaiser 
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(2002), although his cross-sectional analysis shows that females are highly satisfied with 
their jobs in most countries. In this regard, Bilimoria et al. (2006) argue that women are 
mainly satisfied with internal relationships and fairness in the relational support received 
from colleagues, and that these factors positively influence their satisfaction with the job 
as a whole. Sloane and Williams (2000) argue that the satisfaction premium for women 
may be due to self-selection into jobs with highly valued attributes. It is however true 
that differences between males and females have significantly decreased in recent years 
(Sousa-Poza  and  Sousa-Poza,  2003),  probably  because  of  converging  expectations 
between the two genders (Clark 1997). 
Another characteristic of workers usually included in econometric analysis is age. 
The evidence tends to show the existence of a U-shaped pattern with job satisfaction, as 
in the econometrics of happiness. Young and old people are more satisfied with their jobs 
than are middle-aged people (Blanchflower & Oswald 1999; Clark 1997). The authors 
explain this result with the observation that some adaptations by workers emerge over 
time, although this also comes about through a change of job. 
An even more intriguing variable is education, since the evidence shows that this 
is correlated with job satisfaction in a significant and negative way in some instances 
(Skalli et al. 2007; Gazioglu & Tansel, 2006), whilst in others it has no significant impact 
on  job  satisfaction  (Sousa-Poza  &  Sousa-Poza,  2000;  Clark  1997).  In  more  detailed 
studies, tertiary education exhibits a negative effect on the specific satisfaction with pay 
(Skalli et al. 2007), whilst this specific satisfaction is lowest not only among clerical staff 
but  also  among  managers  (Gazioglu  &  Tansel,  2006).  Investment  in  education  thus 
appears to be self-defeating if job satisfaction is considered as the final aim. However, 
education  length  has  also a  positive  indirect  impact  on  job  satisfaction:  it  influences 
health status (ensured by better working and economic conditions, social-psychological 
resources, and a healthy lifestyle); and it is correlated with observable job characteristics 
(Florit  &  Vila  Lladosa,  2007).  On  studying  the  main  characteristics  of  work,  Meng 
(1990) finds that more educated workers are usually more involved in the activity and 
enjoy  higher  levels  of  autonomy;  consequently,  they  are  less  stressed  and  receive 
psychological benefits which positively impact on their job satisfaction. 
The  education  puzzle  may  be  further  explained  by  the  greater  expectations 
induced by education but not realised on the job, and in particular by what has been   16 
termed ‘surplus education’ (Tsang, 1991). Various surveys estimate the match between 
the level of competence required by the job and that offered by the education possessed, 
and they obtain different results. Vila & Garcia-Mora (2005) empirically demonstrate 
that the match between employment and education strictly influences job satisfaction; 
Hersch  (1991)  and  Tsang  et  al.  (1991)  find  a  negative  correlation  between  job 
satisfaction and surplus schooling, especially for workers with higher levels of education. 
Diaz-Serrano & Cabral Vieira (2005) obtain similar results for the correlation between 
over-skilling and job satisfaction; Gazioglu & Tansel (2006) find a negative correlation 
between  education  (but  not  pay)  and  the  specific  satisfaction  comprising  a  sense  of 
achievement. It therefore seems that job satisfaction is enhanced when the education 
level  is  that  required  by  the  organization,  whereas  job  satisfaction  decreases  when 
workers are educated to above the level required (i.e. the role covered).  
Deeper  analysis  has  been  conducted  by  examining  observable  affective  well-
being on the job, besides self-reported job satisfaction. Green & Gallie (2002) find that 
both the level of, and the increase in, the skills required are associated with higher levels 
of arousal among workers, but also greater task discretion and greater participation of 
workers in decisions concerning their jobs, and, to a lesser extent, more support from a 
team. Stress ensues because the arousal is excessive with respect to the other gratifying 
effects. By contrast, under-skilling tends to generate boredom and depression (see also 
Maynard et al. 2006). 
 
3.  Research on the determinants of job performance (Y,ZP) 
 
The  relationship  between  economic  incentives  and  job  performance  has  been 
conventionally  studied in economic theory  as a principal-agent problem, predicting a 
positive correlation between Y and P. Subsection 3.1, after a brief presentation of the 
theoretical analysis, discusses some limitations in the efficiency of economic incentives 
and  illustrates  some  empirical  evidence.  A  more  complex  picture  emerges  when 
productive organisations adopt other incentive schemes aimed at involving workers more 
closely and thereby raise productive performance. Subsection 3.2 examines the literature 
on  these  alternative  organisational  practices.  The  attention  thus  shifts  to  workers’ 
motivation, so that psychology becomes especially important. However, as discussed in   17 
subsection  3.3,  psychology  studies  warn  us  that  workers’  motivation  may  even  be 
reduced by conventional incentives. 
 
3.1 Incentives and job performance: the conventional prediction 
A large body of theoretical literature is devoted to the economics of incentives 
and focuses on various firm’s policies to reward workers (for a comprehensive survey, 
see  Prendergast,  1999).  This  literature  assumes  that  Y  mainly  includes  pay-for-
performance practices (where wages depend on the level of organizational outcomes), 
bonuses, promotions and tournament mechanisms, deferred-compensation schemes. The 
theory argues that these incentives raise the opportunity cost of exit for workers, thus 
inducing them to put in greater levels of effort, which is a disutility for them, to retain the 
job.  
However, the same theory admits that there are limitations in the functioning of 
the  positive  correlation  between  incentives  and  performances.  First  of  all,  pay-for-
performance  practices  allocate  part  of  the  organizational  risk  to  employees  and 
consequently  decrease  their  initial  investments.  Secondly,  economic  incentives  are 
limited to cases where performances are simple to verify, activities are mainly single-
tasking, and the costs of control are quite low. By contrast, most of the time and in many 
sectors, jobs involve multi-tasking, and the principal cannot devise a complete incentives 
scheme to improve the quality (other than quantity) of workers’ performances.
14 Control 
mechanisms may fail owing to the costs of verifying the quality (other than the quantity) 
of the agent’s effort and impossibility of control by third parties (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1991). Finally, tournaments are inefficient when competition between colleagues is a 
source of conflict and reduces cooperation within the group.
15 
Empirical  data  confirm  that  the  significance  of  the  relationship  between 
compensation  and  job  performance  mainly  depends  on  the sector of activity  and the 
characteristic of jobs and tasks. Lazear (1996) shows that classic economic incentives 
                                                 
14 Specifically, the principal specifies only the quantitative dimension as the basis on which economic 
incentives are calculated.  As a consequence, dysfunctional behavioural responses by  the agent, under-
production of the other dimension of the job (quality), and a re-allocation of effort to the component with 
which pay is linked, emerge as inefficiencies. 
15 Tournament theory assumes that internal competition among employees also increases their effort and 
organizational performances, as well as sorting workers with more talents and abilities (Rosen, 1982). The 
assumption, however, is limited by the number of competitors, by the level of the incentive, and especially 
by disruptive behaviours among colleagues.   18 
(like premiums and bonuses) matter in those economic sectors where the outcome is 
strictly measurable.  Greater support for  the positive relationship  between  Y  and P  is 
forthcoming in the case of efficiency wages, i.e., when the principal overpays the worker 
in order to increase the value of her/his job (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984). The positive 
consequence of tournaments on performance when the prize is high has instead been 
tested  by  many  empirical  analyses  (e.g.,  Becker  &  Huselid,  1992).  Some  evidence, 
however, indicates that there is a risk of anti-cooperative behaviour (Drago & Garvey, 
1997). 
As  regards  specific  incentive  mechanisms,  the  empirical  evidence  shows  that 
profit sharing and gain sharing are evaluated by workers as the best economic means to 
increase  their  effort  (Opinion  Research  Corporation,  1957;  Colletti,  1969;  Bella  & 
Hanson, 1987); and also organizations find a positive relationship between profit-sharing 
plans  and  performances  (Brower,  1957;  Metzger,  1975;  National  Commission  on 
Productivity and Work Quality, 1975; New York Stock Exchange, 1982; Smith, 1986; 
O’Dell & MacAdams, 1987), because indexes of workers’ productivity (such as value 
added and sales per employee) increase with incentives (Cable & FitzRoy, 1980; Conte 
& Svejnar, 1988; Kruse, 1988; Wadhwani & Wall, 1988; Mitchell et al., 1989). 
In spite of the large number of surveys supporting the contention that incentives 
matter, it should also be noted that rigorous empirical studies show that the positive 
relationship  between  Y  and  P  emerges  only  (or  at  least  mainly)  when  it  improves 
workers’ cooperation and morale (Metzger, 1966). Another consistent finding is that the 
marginal effect on performances is especially high in organizations characterised by a 
cooperative climate (Defourney et al., 1987 on French cooperatives; Jones & Svejnar, 
1985 on Italian cooperatives; Jones, 1987 on British cooperatives).  
In conclusion, a large body of empirical evidence shows that the link between Y 
and P is positive; but also that it is variable, mainly because it depends on the extent to 
which workers are involved in the productive process and results, and how they perceive 
the social context. It is for this reason that both theoretical studies and empirical data 
support the hypothesis that other extra-economic factors enter the relationship among 
productivity, effort and job satisfaction (Akerlof & Yellen, 1984). 
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3.2 High Performance Workplace Practices 
A specific strand of research studies job performance, linked to job satisfaction 
and to compensation, from the perspective of the organisational changes induced by the 
increased global competition and the rapid developments in information technology of 
the 1980s and 1990s. The new type of organisation that has emerged has been called 
High  Performance  Workplace  Practices  (HPWP),  because  it  refers  not  simply  to 
monetary incentives but to complex incentives schemes. Specifically, HPWP comprise 
two kinds of practices: (i) alternative work practices like multi-tasking, job rotation, self-
responsible  teams,  problem-solving  groups,  flat  hierarchical  structures,  horizontal 
communication,  and  (ii)  high-commitment  employment  practices  like  sophisticated 
selection  and  training,  behaviour-based  appraisal,  contingent  pay  systems  (pay-for-
knowledge, group bonuses, and profit sharing). According to their proponents, HPWP 
enable workers to develop, share and apply their knowledge and skills more fully than do 
traditional practices, with positive implications for job satisfaction and job performance. 
It is claimed that HPWP redeem workers from the alienation of the Taylorist division of 
labour and hierarchical structure and give them the motivating and self-rewarding work 
activities of the recent knowledge-based modes of production (Ichniowski et al. (1996); 
Godard 2004; Handel & Levine 2004; Freeman et al. 2000).
16  
The results of studies on the effects of HPWP on organisational performance and 
productivity,  and  on  workers’  satisfaction  are  mixed.  Ichniowski  et  al.  (2000)  find 
positive results if clusters of new work practices are implemented, thus supporting the 
argument  that  these  practices  are  complementary.  Cristini  et  al.  (2003)  find  that 
productivity  increases  if  practices  are  complementary  to  the  adoption  of  new 
technologies. Further positive results are reported by Appelbaum et al. (2000) for some 
industries in the US, by Patterson, West & Nickell (1997) with reference to British firms, 
and by Greenan (1996) in a survey on French industries. Combs et al. (2006), in a meta-
analysis  of  articles  in  human  resources  management  journals,  estimate  a  significant 
correlation of 0.20 between organisational performance and HPWP.  
Positive  results  focused  on  the  correlation  between  a  variety  of  HPWP  and 
workers’ job satisfaction have been found in the US (Batt 2004), in Japan (Chuma et al. 
2007),  in  the  EU  (Bauer  2004;  Oriogo  &  Pagani  2006),  and  specifically  in  Finland 
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(Kalmi  &  Kauhanen  2008).  Positive  results  have  also  been  obtained  for  wages  and 
compensations, which appear to be correlated with HPWP (Black & Lynch 2000; Bailey 
et al. 2001; Kalmi & Kauhanen 2008; Cristini 2008). In particular, Helper et al. (2002) 
observe that wages are higher when HPWP are adopted even if training is controlled for, 
while turnover and supervision variables are not significant. Hence HPWP lend support 
to the efficiency wage approach, and specifically to Ackerlof’s (1984) argument of gift-
exchange,  whereas  neither  Salop’s  (1979)  thesis  on  turnover  costs,  nor  Shapiro  & 
Stiglitz’s (1984) on shirking, appear to be supported. 
However, some other studies cast serious doubts on these positive results. HPWP 
have weak and poorly specified effects on productivity according to Freeman et al.’s 
(2000) study. Cappelli & Neumark (2001) find similar results, and they add that practices 
of this kind are even associated with increased labour costs. Insignificant correlations for 
both effort and job satisfaction are the result of Harley’s (2002) study. Handel & Levine 
(2004) and Handel & Gittleman (2004) find little evidence that HPWP are associated 
with higher wages.  
Godard (2004) scrutinizes a number of authoritative studies, identifying serious 
limitations and weaknesses which undermine their significance. Disentangling the effects 
of HPWP and evaluating their size are especially difficult because HPWP interact with 
other variables, such as establishment size, technology and market context, and because 
HPWP may interact with traditional practices – given that this mix is prevalent in most 
cases – contravening the complementarity hypothesis. Evaluations of the convenience of 
HPWP should also take their costs into account.  
The specific negative effects of HPWP – Godard (2001) observes – are work 
overload, workers’ stress, and negative job-to-home externality, so that HPWP may have 
increasing returns if moderately applied, and then decreasing ones, which may even be 
negative  if extensively  applied.  In  fact,  stimulating  and involving  work  may  become 
intense and accelerated, and peer pressure for stronger performance norms may emerge 
(see also Belanger’s 2000 survey). This suggestion is interesting, because it can explain 
cases  in  which  HPWP  have  simultaneously  positive  effects  on  organisational 
productivity and wages and negative ones on workers’ satisfaction. 
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3.3. Incentives and job performance: an alternative approach? 
Psychology research has accumulated a great amount of experimental evidence on 
the so-called crowding out of motivations which has sparked a heated debate in that 
discipline, but  which is  also of special  interest  for  the economics of incentives.  The 
concept of crowding-out is defined as the displacement of intrinsic motivations for an 
activity, which means pursuing an activity for its own sake, by an offer of a material 
reward for doing it, i.e. by an extrinsic motivation. The reason for this effect is that 
“rewards can lead people away from their interests and their inner desire for challenge, 
instead prompting for a more narrow instrumental focus” (Ryan & Deci 2000:37). 
Typical experimental studies on crowding out used to be applied on performance-
contingent  rewards  conditions,  where  participants  received  a  monetary  reward  for 
“having done well at the activity” (Ryan et al. 1983), or because they were said to have 
“performed  better  than  80%  of  other  participants”  (Harackiewicz  et  al.  1984).  The 
conclusions of the most recent and comprehensive works in this strand of research, i.e. 
the survey by Deci et al. (1999) and the book edited by Sansone & Harackiewicz (2000), 
are in fact striking. First, “the type of rewards that was most detrimental was […] one in 
which people’s rewards are provided as a direct function of their performance”; second, 
“the finding of negative effects of engagement-contingent rewards [which is dependent 
on  simply  engaging  in  the  activity]  is  extremely  important  […].  For  example,  most 
hourly  employees  get  paid  for  working  at  their  jobs  without  having  the  pay  tied 
specifically to the number of tasks completed” (Ryan & Deci 2000:26,29).
17 
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on the job was also 
proposed by Porter & Lawler (1968), who argued that a worker’s interest in the activity 
increases  her/his  performance.  This  case,  where  the  favourable  effects  of  intrinsic 
motivations on job performance add to those of extrinsic motivations, can also be called 
the crowding-in case. Both cases depart from conventional economic theory, since this 
implicitly assumes that intrinsic motivations are constant and embodied in preferences.  
According  to  Deci  &  Ryan  (1985:ch.4),  the  occurrence  of  crowding-out  or 
crowding-in is due to distinct conditions which can be synthesised as  controlling, or 
informational and supporting conditions. In the former case, rewards perform a control 
function on how the activity is performed, and this undermines the individual’s self-
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determination  and  autonomy.  In  the  latter  case,  rewards  perform  an  informational 
function  on  the individual’s  effectance  of her/his  action,  and on how this  is  socially 
valued.  Therefore,  interesting  tasks,  positive  feedbacks  in  interpersonal  relations, 
participation in procedures and decisions may turn the controlling function of extrinsic 
rewards into a supporting informational function. 
Cases of crowding-in are evidenced by studies on workers’ participation on the 
job. High budgetary participation in combination with high budget emphasis has been 
found to be a significant condition for the positive correlation between economic rewards 
and workers’ performance (Brownell, 1982; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Duck, 
1991; Harrison, 1992; Lau & Buckland, 2000). This is due to workers’ perceptions and 
collection of information about their job, and about their organization more generally, 
which also positively influences their job satisfaction (Lau & Tan, 2003). 
Participation  in  organizational  decisions  and  productivity  seems  to  explain 
workers’ performances better than profit sharing or other economic rewards (Blinder ed., 
1990). The majority of empirical surveys demonstrate that the correlation is positive and 
also very significant (Cable & FitzRoy, 1980; Defourney et al., 1985; Jones, 1987; Ben-
Ner & Estrin, 1988; Morishima, 1988; Mitchell et al., 1989), although some empirical 
analyses find no correlation between this kind of workers’ participation (Svejnar, 1982; 
Katz et al., 1987; Kruse, 1988), whilst others find a negative correlation (Katz et al., 
1985; Kraft & FitzRoy, 1987). 
Bartel et al.’s (2004) intriguing study shows the importance of the interpersonal 
environment on the job for work performance, which is consistent with the crowding-in 
effect. They consider the role of work attitude in the performance of branches of the 
same firm, rather than individual workers’ performances. They first define attitude as the 
composite  index  of  employees’  judgments  on  supervisors,  team  cooperation, 
transparency in employees’ evaluations, and distributive fairness. They then observe that 
the heterogeneity of attitudes within branches is smaller than the heterogeneity across 
them, which demonstrates employees’ conformism, or something called the ‘branch’s 
attitude’. The economic performance of the various branches in terms of sales, turnovers, 
and closures proves to be correlated with the ‘branch’s attitude’. 
Frey (1997) and Frey & Jegen (2001) have addressed the problem of crowding-
out  and  crowding-in  within  economics  through  a  reinterpretation  in  terms  of  agency   23 
theory and a survey of the evidence on crowding-out in a variety of cases.
18 They point 
out that incentives involve both benefits and motivational costs for the agent, and that the 
costs  may  outweigh  the  benefits  under  certain  conditions.  For  example,  they  report 
Barkema’s (1995) econometric paper showing that, in a case concerning managers and 
the parent company, controlling the agents has negative effects on their job performance. 
This result is confirmed by Minkler (2002), who finds that monitoring is both 
negatively and significantly correlated with self-reported effort, after controlling for self-
reported  intrinsic  motivation  (which  emerges  as  significant),  work  ethic,  and  peer-
pressure. This result is again confirmed, but in an experimental principal-agent game, by 
Falk and Kosfeld (2006), who add that “when asked for their emotional perception of 
control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision 
as a signal of distrust  and a limitation  of their choice autonomy” (Falk  and  Kosfeld 
2006:1611). 
Some tests on the effects of the different forms of incentives have shown that 
base-pay is related to job performance, whereas bonuses are not (Kuvaas 2006), and 
targeted  incentives  are  negatively  related  to  it,  which  suggests  some  crowding  out 
(Valentini 2005).  
A recent meta-analysis concentrates on experimental studies which address the 
effect  of  incentives  on  task  performance  (quantity  and/or  quality  measures)  and  use 
control  groups  and  adult  populations.  Both  economic  and  psychology  journals  are 
considered.  The  meta-analysis  finds  that  incentives  increase  performance  with  a 
significant  coefficient  (0.41),  but  only  when  tasks  are  simple  and/or  boring,  while 
performance  is  reduced  with  a significant  coefficient  (-0.13) when tasks are difficult 
and/or interesting (Weibel et al. 2007). 
 
4.  Two routes from job performance to job satisfaction (PW) 
 
The relationship between job satisfaction and job performance (PW) is not 
new in the psychology literature. It was investigated extensively some time ago, until an 
authoritative  survey  published  in  the  1980s  concluded  that  the  relationship  was  not 
quantitatively appreciable, so that the research on the topic appeared to have reached a 
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dead end (Iaffaldano & Muchinsky, 1985; see also Bagozzi, 1980; Brown & Peterson, 
1993; Baryfield & Crockett, 1955). 
Recently, however, another extensive survey by Judge et al. (2001), which also 
conducts a more rigorous meta-analysis, reverses the conclusions. Its starting framework 
is clear because it distinguishes studies on the effects of P on W from studies on the 
effects of W on P. Whilst W has been measured in various ways, P is usually determined 
by the performance of workers as reported by supervisors. Judge et al. (2001) thus draw 
the main conclusion that the correlation between job satisfaction and job performance is 
positive and significant, that it is strict for complex jobs, but generally moderate (0.30).  
This result is encouraging, but it still falls short of the theoretical expectations, so 
that the debate has been re-opened. In particular, recent research addresses the problem 
of the direction of causality between job satisfaction and job performance. In fact, not 
only do different arguments appear to support the two opposite directions of causality, 
but some arguments support a negative effect, and others a positive effect. Therefore, the 
relationship between job satisfaction and job performance should be studied within a 
framework where the two variables are clearly defined, and the interrelationship with 
other variables is considered. More encouraging levels of the partial correlations may 
thus be found. 
This  Section  concentrates  on  research  supporting  the  causation  from  job 
performance to job satisfaction, whereas Section 5 concentrates on research supporting 
the opposite causation. The line of reasoning can be followed by looking at the scheme in 
Section 1. 
 
4.1 The positive route from job performance to job satisfaction 
Judge et al. (2001) suggest that the positive correlation between P and W can be 
explained because performance on the job affects self-esteem. The consistency between 
actual  behaviour  and  self-esteem  thus  positively  enters  the  determination  of  job 
satisfaction.  In  terms  of  our  scheme,  this  can  be  represented  by  the  route  from  PO 
through S to W.  
The  concept  of  self-esteem  refers  to  an  individual’s  overall  self-evaluation  of 
her/his competencies, with an affective component (liking/disliking) about her/himself. 
Korman (1966:479) points out that individuals with high self-esteem have a “sense of   25 
personal adequacy and a sense of having achieved need satisfaction in the past”. More 
specifically,  ‘organization-based  self-esteem’  has  been  defined  in  the  psychology 
literature  as  the  extent  to  which  an  individual  believes  her/himself  to  be  capable, 
significant, and worthy as an organizational member (Pierce & Gardner 2004). Korman 
(1970)  argues  that  global  self-esteem  is  central  to  the  explanation  of  employee’s 
motivation,  job  performance  and  job  satisfaction.  More  specific  studies  find  that 
organization-based  self-esteem  is  significantly  and  highly  correlated  with  several 
variables which underlie motivation on the job, like personal autonomy and competence, 
complex and interesting jobs, distributive and procedural fairness in the organisation, job 
security,  and  with  job  satisfaction,  including  stress  and  physical  strain,  whilst 
organization-based  self-esteem  seems  to  have  a  two-way  role  with  job  performance 
(Pierce & Gardner 2004). 
The  relationship  between  job  performance  and  job  satisfaction  has  been 
reconsidered, after Judge et al. (2001), by a meta-analysis which controls for self-esteem 
variables  (Bowling  2007)  and  yields  interesting  results.  If  the  job  performance-
satisfaction correlation is controlled for global self-esteem, it drops to 0.23; if controlled 
for organization-based self-esteem, it drops to 0.09, although remaining significant in 
both cases. The role of self-esteem also appears significant against the role of personality 
traits. In fact, if the job performance/satisfaction correlation is controlled for personality 
traits, it drops to 0.19. 
Because organization-based self-esteem is a social construct, it can be influenced 
by the organisation. In their review, Pierce & Gardner (2004) conclude that organization-
based  self-esteem  is  positively  associated  with  a  number  of  variables  capturing 
organisational features, i.e. work environment structures and management practices (e.g., 
social system design, technology, participatory leadership and management practices, job 
design) that give rise to opportunities for self-direction and self-control, signals from 
organizations  which  communicate  to  employees  that  they  are  a  valued,  important, 
competent  and  capable  part  of  the  organization  (e.g.,  trust,  perceived  organizational 
support, pay level, fairness, ownership), positive and success-building role conditions 
(e.g.,  performance  support,  security,  role  clarity).  These  conclusions  support  the  link 
between Z and S via P.   26 
A  different  body  of  psychology  research  instead  concentrates  on  work 
motivations,  and  on  the  underlying  favourable  organisational  conditions,  by 
distinguishing intrinsic motivations which crucially contribute to the development of the 
individual’s  self.  According  to  Deci  and  Ryan  and  their  team,  intrinsic  motivation 
requires interest in the job, and this brings the individual to inner well-being, because 
intrinsically motivated activities satisfy basic human psychological needs, thus enriching 
her/his self (Deci & Ryan 1985, 2000; Gagné & Deci 2005).
19 
An  established  result  of  Deci  and  Ryan’s  research  is  that  people  particularly 
inclined  to  intrinsic  motivations  exhibit  relatively  greater  well-being  (Kasser  2002). 
Specific  studies  on  the  work  setting  confirm  this  result,  and  extend  it  to  the  job 
conditions enhancing intrinsic motivations. Gagné & Deci (2005) find that managerial 
support  for  employees’  autonomy  positively  affects  both  job  satisfaction  and  job 
performance. The supporting actions applied are the following: giving to employees non-
controlling informational feedback as well as opportunities to take initiatives, i.e. make 
choices and solve problems, and recognising and accepting their perspectives in terms of 
needs and feelings (see also Baard 2002). Otis & Pelletier (2005) find that the employees 
who perceive a supervisor as being highly supportive of their autonomy is correlated 
with  their  intrinsic  motivations  and  job  satisfaction,  in  terms  of  reduced  physical 
symptoms. Richer et al. (2002) find that feelings of relatedness toward work colleagues, 
and  feelings  of  competence  jointly  and  positively  affect  self-determined  work 
motivation, which in turn facilitates job satisfaction, with discouraging effects on labour 
turnover. 
Evidence favourable for the intrinsic motivations approach to performance and 
satisfaction in the workplace is provided by other psychology studies. Ng et al.’s (2006) 
meta-analysis shows the importance of the locus of control, whether internal or external 
to the individual, for both job performance and job satisfaction. Ilardi et al.’s (1993) test 
on the positive influence of satisfaction of basic psychological needs in the workplace on 
job performance and well-being is also favourable, where well-being is measured with a 
mental health questionnaire. 
                                                 
19  More  precisely,  intrinsic  motivation  satisfies  the  basic  psychological  needs  for  competence,  i.e.  for 
controlling outcomes of one’s own actions and experiencing their effectance, for autonomy, i.e. for feeling 
the internal origin of own actions, and for relatedness with others. Satisfaction of these basic psychological 
needs makes the individual’s self more sophisticated and able to deal with the external world (Deci & Ryan 
1985).   27 
Economic studies on the importance of intrinsic motivations for job satisfaction 
are  Borzaga  &  Tortia  (2006),  and  Sousa-Poza  &  Sousa-Poza  (2000),  who  find  that 
autonomy,  which  is  another  component  of  intrinsic  motivation,  is  significantly  and 
positively correlated with job satisfaction. Hechanova, Alampay & Franco (2006), Huang 
&  van  de  Vliert  (2002)  further  find  that,  besides  intrinsic  motivations,  also  intrinsic 
rewards,  which  may  be  earned  from  interesting  and  challenging  types  of  jobs,  are 
positively correlated with job satisfaction. 
These results are also consistent with other research in organisational studies. A 
rather general line of inquiry in psychology is called Positive Organizational Behavior, 
which is “the study and application of positively oriented human resource strengths and 
psychological capacities that can be measured, developed, and effectively managed for 
performance improvement in today’s workplace” (Luhtans 2003:179; see also Luhtans 
2002; Wright 2003; Salanova et al. 2006). 
 
4.2 The negative route from job performance to job satisfaction 
Economic theory, and in particular agency theory and efficiency wage theory, 
assumes that worker’s effort positively enters her/his production function, but negatively 
her/his utility function, which represents her/his satisfaction on the job. It thus implicitly 
assumes that worker’s effort immediately translates into her/his performance on the job. 
Therefore, job performance can be evaluated by observing effort as its input (PI), or 
directly when realised as an outcome, and observed by, e.g., supervisors (PO). 
Usually, studies on the link from job performance to job satisfaction take PO for 
job performance, thus finding a positive relationship. But when work effort is specifically 
addressed (PI), usually through self-reported evaluation, then a negative relationship is 
found by a number of studies (Clark & Oswald, 1996; Sloane & Williams 2000; Green & 
Tsitsianis 2005). However, this result is weakened in the case of high occupational levels 
(Ghinetti,  2007);  and  if  effort  is  combined  with  team  support  it  becomes  positively 
correlated with job satisfaction (Green & Gallie 2002). 
A proxy for effort may also be actual working time, which too negatively enters 
the worker’s utility function, according to economic theory. However, the evidence is 
mixed in this case. Schwochau (1987) finds a positive relationship, whereas Clark (1996) 
and Clark & Oswald (1996) find a negative correlation between working hours and job   28 
satisfaction.  In particular, workers appear increasingly dissatisfied with their working 
hours in Greece, Italy and Spain (Skalli et al. 2007), in the UK and Germany (Green & 
Tsitsianis 2005), while a rising number of people would prefer to work less in Germany 
(Green & Tsitsianis 2005). In other studies, it emerges that the number of working hours 
is negatively correlated with job satisfaction generally, except in the UK, where it is 
positively  correlated  (Diaz-Serrano  &  Cabral  Vieira  2005),  and  it  is  also  negatively 
correlated with the special job satisfaction regarding influence over the job (Gazioglu & 
Tansel 2006) (see also Souzo-Poza & Henneberger 2000). Sousa-Poza & Sousa-Poza 
(2000) find that the relative majority of workers are satisfied with their working time, a 
second and substantial part would prefer to work more, and a third part would prefer to 
work  less.  These  considerations  are  in  line  with  studies  on  voluntary  part-time  jobs, 
which show that job satisfaction is less for workers with involuntary part-time contracts 
(Buddelmeyer, Mourre & Ward, 2004). 
It may be that these results are mixed because they reflect both the negative route 
from PI to U and the positive route from PO to S. More specific analysis would be 
required to disentangle the effects of the two routes. For example, deliberately chosen 
overtime may help in capturing the positive route.  
By contrast, an excessive workload is undoubtedly harmful to job satisfaction, 
and also to health. This has been found by Clark (1997), and, with more careful analysis, 
by Golden & Wiens-Tuers (2006).  
 
4.3 A synthesis 
A  comprehensive  test  that  captures  both  routes  from  job  performance  to  job 
satisfaction is provided by Christen et al. (2006). More precisely, they test a structural 
model  with  the  SUR  method,  which  includes  the  following  links:  (PI,PO,Y,Z)W, 
(Y,Z)PI, (PI)PO. They then find interesting results that confirm our scheme.  
First,  the  distinction  between  the  two  routes  linking  P  to  W  is  not  simply  a 
refinement; instead, it resolves the central issues stated in Section 1: the sign (III.1), 
which is both negative and positive; the significance (III.2), which is strong rather than 
moderate; and the direct causality from P to W (III.3-4), rather than the reverse. Omitting 
one of the two routes in the estimates gives rise to biased results.    29 
Secondly, the impact of income on both job performance and job satisfaction is 
less  than  expected  by  the  economic  wisdom.  In  fact,  the  impact  on  PI  due  to 
compensation is not significant, and that due to profits-sharing is weakly significant, 
while the impact on W due to profits-sharing is halved with respect to the impact of job 
attractiveness, and, again, almost halved in the case of compensation. These results also 
partially meet issues (I) and (II) of Section 1.
20 Crowding-in thus emerges as being rather 
weak, although a specific test for its conditions is not applied. 
 
5.  From job satisfaction to job performance through happiness (WP) 
 
The  most  successful  approach  put  forward  in  the  literature  to  explain  the 
causation from job satisfaction to job performance – which is the reverse of that explored 
in  Section  4  – combines  two  lines  of inquiry in  happiness  research. A  subsection  is 
devoted to each of them. 
 
5.1 The effects of happiness on job performance in psychology research 
In the psychology literature, research on the effects of job satisfaction  on job 
performance has not yielded satisfactory results (Judge et al. 2001). However, a recent 
attempt has been more successful. This has shifted the focus from job satisfaction, which 
mainly relates to cognition, to a more general conception of happiness, which mainly 
relates it to emotions and affect and will be termed H. In this way, a clear result has been 
obtained: that happy people are more successful on the job. 
This  result  is  supported  by  a  recent  and  detailed  meta-analysis  conducted  by 
Lyubomirsky et al. (2005), although they do not consider whether H is an endogenous 
variable  or  whether  it  is  exogenously  fixed.  More  explicitly,  Wright  &  Staw  (1998) 
consider worker well-being as an exogenous general disposition, and find a significant 
and sizeable effect of H on P. Even more specifically, Boehm & Lyubomirsky (2007) 
preliminarily  define  a happy  person  as someone who frequently  experiences positive 
emotions like joy, satisfaction, contentment, enthusiasm and interest. Then, by drawing 
on both longitudinal and experimental studies, they show that people of this kind are 
more likely to be successful in their careers. 
                                                 
20 Also PI emerges as positively and significantly correlated with PO.   30 
The underlying arguments are that employees with high positive affect are able to 
handle jobs requiring the performance of a wide range of tasks and described as more 
meaningful and more autonomous (Staw et al, 1994). More  generally,  Carver (2003) 
argues that people in a good mood are more likely to enter novel situations, interact with 
other people, and pursue new goals. 
A line of inquiry that shares this intuition has been pursued by Isen (2000), who 
studies how positive emotions and feelings (i.e. H) influence individuals’ modes and 
capacities of choice including some innovative content (i.e. P). The link between H and 
P remains simple, but the concept of P becomes complex, because it includes creative 
ability. In fact, Isen finds various effects of H on P that can be summarized as follows. 
Found to increase is the information perceived, interest in problems, problem-solving 
capacity,  expectations  of  success  if  involved  in  an  uncertain  activity,  the  ability  to 
mediate and to negotiate with others, to intuit the other person’s pay-off, to decide more 
quickly  by  selecting  among  the  options  more  rapidly,  and  finally  to  respond  more 
creatively.
21 Therefore, positive affect does not induce careless and superficial behaviour, 
but rather gives rise to responsible behaviour, and possibly selects enjoyable activities 
(Isen & Reeve 2005). 
 
5.2 The effects of job satisfaction on happiness 
Happiness  research  has  been  recently  developed  around  the  issue  of  whether 
happiness significantly varies over the life cycle, or whether it is idiosyncratic to adult 
individuals and is thus a personal trait. One line of inquiry has focused on the distinction 
among life domains where people may be successful. 
This line of inquiry has obtained a result of interest to this survey: namely that job 
satisfaction  is  one  of  the  most  important  life  domains  for  an  individual’s  happiness 
(Easterlin 2005; Layard 2005). The other most important life domain is that of the family 
and other social relations, whilst health becomes especially important during old age (X). 
A specific study on job satisfaction and satisfaction with life finds that the former is very 
important  for  the  latter,  together  with  personal  characteristics  included  in  our  X 
(Helliwell & Huang, 2005). Therefore, this result and that of the previous subsection 5.1 
aid understanding of the links of W to H, and of H to P, as depicted in Fig. 1. 
                                                 
21 Not increased, instead, are expectations of success in gambles, or interest and skill in boring games.   31 
6.  An economic framework for an integrated analysis 
 
The results of the studies reported in the previous sections yield the complex 
picture represented in Fig. 1. The evidence on the link Y,ZW, as surveyed in Section 2, 
has shown that the relationship between monetary compensation and job satisfaction is 
significant, but only in cross-section studies and not in time-series studies, and that it is 
not  of  primary  importance.  In  fact,  what  emerges  as  primarily  important  for  job 
satisfaction is working in an interesting job well-matched with the competence offered, 
followed by being actively involved in the productive process and results, and enjoying 
relatedness at work. Studies on the Y,ZP link, as surveyed in Section 3, have shown 
that income is not necessarily an efficacious incentive for job performance. Obstacles 
against participation in procedures and decisions, the type of controls  exerted on the 
person’s work, and an unfriendly interpersonal environment may also condition the sign 
of the link from income to job performance. Studies on the PW link reveal that 
causation may operate in both directions, but through different routes. Studies on the 
PW link, as surveyed in Section 4, have shown that the key input to job performance, 
i.e. work effort, is negatively correlated with job satisfaction, whilst job performance as 
an outcome is positively correlated with job satisfaction. Studies on the WP link, as 
surveyed in Section 5, have shown that job satisfaction is important for happiness, and 
that happiness positively correlates with success on the job. 
This  set  of  evidence  suggests  that  the  picture  depicted  by  the  conventional 
economic theory should be reconsidered and possible enlarged. The present Section takes 
up this suggestion by drawing on the literature on identity and self-esteem. 
The  theoretical  focus  is  on  employees’  preferences  regarding  their  work.  It 
considers that employees can earn a reward from work by taking account of their identity 
or  self-esteem,  besides  the  rewards  deriving  from  the  contractual  conditions.  This 
approach  is  not  new  in  the  economic  literature,  because  of  two  groundbreaking 
contributions. On the one hand, Ackerlof & Kranton (2000; 2003) consider the psychic 
reward deriving from the individual’s identity (or self-image) through a simple extension 
of the conventional utility function, and then apply this idea to workers in organisations. 
On the other hand, Becker (1996) considers the possibility that individuals can raise their 
human capital  and  abilities in  order to  increase  psychic  income as well  as  monetary   32 
income.
22 Substantial evidence of the importance of identity (or self-image) for work 
performance  and  job  satisfaction  is  provided  by  psychology  studies  on  self-esteem, 
which have already been briefly discussed in Section 4.1. 
Let us take the employee’s satisfaction on the job (W) as a function of her/his 
conventional utility (U), and of psychic rewards from her/his identity (S). The variables 
U and S are proxied in economic research on job satisfaction as specific domains or 
facets of overall job satisfaction: U is usually  proxied by satisfaction  with total pay, 
earnings, career, or also short-term rewards; S is usually proxied by satisfaction with the 
actual work itself (Clark 1997), with the type of work (Skalli et al. 2007), with the sense 
of  achievement  (Gaziouglu  &  Tansel  2006),  with  intrinsic  incentives  embodying 
decision-making autonomy, variety and creativity, recognition of one’s contribution and 
professional development (Tortia 2008). Surveys usually find that these two domains are 
the  most  important  ones  (Clark  1997;  Skalli  et  al.  2007;  Tortia  2008).  The  specific 
domains  of  satisfaction  are  functions  of  the  economic  and  extra-economic  variables. 
Skalli et al. (2007) calls this approach ‘Lancasterian’, arguing that the employee chooses 
among jobs, and not directly among job features, so that her/his overall satisfaction is due 
to a weighted average of the specific facets of satisfaction.  
The worker’s overall function can be specified thus: 
(1)  W =   PI) [U (Y, P I, Z) +    S (Y, P O, Z)]+(1   PI)) V      0 
where U and S are positive and concave functions in all the arguments, except UPI<0, 
UPIPI<0. In particular: U(0,PI,Z)=S(Y,0,Z)=0. The arguments within these two functions 
are  not  independent,  except  UPIY  which is  reasonably  equal  to  zero,  as  it  is  usually 
assumed in the efficiency wage literature (e.g. Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984).
23  
Equation (1) allows one to distinguish P as effort when it enters U (i.e. PI), thus 
representing fatigue and stress, and P as expected personal achievement when it enters S 
(i.e. PO), thus representing the psychic reward from the job.
24 The two routes from P to 
W in Fig. 1 are thus identified.  
                                                 
22 The similarity between Ackerlof & Kranton’s analysis and Becker’s approach has been also been pointed 
out by Sobel (2005). 
23 If we think about the physical fatigue of working, it is obvious that monetary compensation does not 
alter it. The main effect of Y on U is direct. 
24 Personal achievement (POi) may be distinct from productive results (POj). The former is more relevant 
to S, while the latter is more relevant to the firm’s performance. The two dimensions should be strongly 
linked, but little empirical work have been done on this point.   33 
The two versions of P are positively linked, i.e.: 
(2)  PO = f(P I)               with f’>0     and      0=f(0) 
so that: 
(1’)  W =   PI) [U (Y, P I, Z) +    Sf (Y, P I, Z)] +(1   PI)) V. 
The distinction between U and S is useful for two reasons: because the concept of 
intrinsic  motivation  can  be  represented  by  the  expected  reward  Sf
PI,  which  has  an 
important role in our analysis, and because Y and Z may be expected to enter the two 
functions with different weights. More precisely, UY may be expected to be rather large, 
whereas Sf
Y may be expected to be rather small or even zero, as confirmed by several 
findings  (Clark  1997;  Skalli  et  al.  2007;  Gaziouglu  &  Tansel  2006;  Tortia  2008). 
Symmetrically, UZ may be expected to be rather small or even zero, whereas Sf
Z may be 
expected to be rather large, as suggested by some findings on specific Z-variables. For 
example, Clark (1997) and Skalli et al. (2007) find that the establishment size is not 
significant  or  with  ambiguous  sign  in  the  estimation  of  U,  whereas  it  is  positively 
significant in the estimation of S. Gaziouglu & Tansel (2006) find that the occupations of 
manager and clerk with respect to sales person negatively and positively enter the two 
estimations  respectively.  Tortia  (2008)  instead  finds  that  distributive  and  procedural 
fairness always enters significantly and positively.  
The variable V represents the worker’s reserve satisfaction as the outside option; 
and      represents  the  probability  of  taking  the  job  as  a  positive  function  of  her/his 
individual effort. This can be justified, in a partial equilibrium framework, by assuming 
that  the firm  does  not  observe  an individual worker’s  effort, but  rather  observes the 
productive outcome of the whole team of workers. The less positive is the outcome, more 
workers will be randomly fired.
25 The workers thus evaluate their satisfaction on the job, 
controlling for PI, against their outside option. The less they fix PI, the more they expect 
to be fired. At zero PI, they expect that the firm will fire all of them, because all workers 
are  identical.  The  maximum  PI  can  be  defined,  i.e.  PImax,  so  that  U(Y,PImax,Z)=0. 
Therefore, the following properties hold:  PI>0,  PIPI<0,    )  , 0 PI PImax. 
                                                 
25 The firm’s behaviour is here sketched in a way consistent with Shapiro & Stiglitz’s (1984) shirking 
model.   34 
The happiness variable H does not appear in (1) and (1’) because it is partially 
endogenised, so that the functions U and Sf embody both the multiplier effect, assumed 
as bounded, and individual fixed effects as represented by X.  
The worker thus maximises W by taking PI as the control variable, Y as fixed by 
the firm, and Z as exogenous. Let us first consider the conventional and special case of 
 =0. In this case a positive internal solution exists, say PI*| =0, because W=0 at both 
PI=0 and PI=PImax, so that: 
(3)  PI*| =0 = PI*(Y, Z, V) . 
This implies the conventional result that greater Y induces the worker to put in 
greater PI*. In fact: 
               PI [UY] 
(4)  PI*Y| =0 =   WPIY /WPIPI| =0 =                                 >0 
 [UPIPI] +  PIPI [U   V] + 2 PI [UPI] 
since the numerator is greater than zero, and the denominator smaller than zero, if U>V. 
Note, however, that U can be very low for very low Y, so that the denominator may be 
negative.  Therefore,  a  positive  level  of  Y  exists,  say  Ymin,  such  that 
PI*| =0=PI*(Ymin,Z,V)=0. This means that a minimum level of Y, which may be partially 
traded off with Z, is necessary to attract individuals to a job, insofar they maintain a 
positive reserve utility level V. The second derivative PI*YY| =0 can be proved to be 
negative.
26 
The maximised W can be thus determined, and in particular the following can be 
derived: 
(5)  W*Y| =0 =   UY + PI*Y UPI ].  
In order to obtain greater job satisfaction, the direct positive benefit coming from the 
monetary incentive must be greater than the indirect cost through a higher level of effort. 
This condition is usually  unnoticed, but it becomes interesting in the analysis of job 
satisfaction. 
Let us consider the extended version of (1’) with  >0. In this case, PI adds a 
positive effect on W through Sf to the negative and positive effects through U  and   
respectively. If the negative effect prevails when PI is close to PImax, so that WPIPI<0, 
                                                 
26 Note that the effort function (3) has the standard properties adopted in the efficiency wage models, i.e. it 
is concave in Y only starting from a positive level of Y.    35 
which is a reasonable restriction, then an interior solution for PI still exists. The first 
interesting result in this case is that the larger is    the greater is the interior solution for 
PI, thus making V relatively smaller. In fact: 
           [Sf
PI] +  PI [Sf] 
(6)  PI*  =                     
WPIPI| >0 
The second result is that in this case the sign of PI*Y may be positive or negative, 
even if V remains sufficiently low. In fact: 
       [  Sf
PIY] +  PI [UY +   Sf
Y] 
(7)  PI*Y| >0 =                            
        W PIPI| >0 
where  the  numerator  depends  on  Sf
PIY.  More  precisely,  the  numerator  is  positive  if 
Sf
PIY>0,  or  if  both  Sf
PIY<0  and    [ Sf
PIY]< PI[UY+ Sf
Y].  In  words,  if  intrinsic 
motivations are increased, or if they are only slightly reduced by monetary incentives, 
then the crowding-in  effect on job performance takes place. The numerator of (7) is 
negative  if  both  Sf
PIY<0  and    [ Sf
PIY]> PI[UY+ Sf
Y].  In  words,  if  intrinsic 
motivations are heavily reduced by monetary incentives, i.e. they overcome the positive 
effects on U and S, then the crowding-out effect on job performance takes place. Note 
that Ymin also makes PI*|  0=0, because of the property Sf(Y,0,Z)=0. 
The existence of crowding-out by observing Sf
PIY has been tested by Weibel et al. 
(2007) with a confirmatory result. They also suggest that Sf
PIY may become less negative 
and crowding-out may disappear if monetary incentives are very high. This means that 
Sf
PIYY must be sufficiently negative.
27 
Considering   >0  also  positively  affects  job  satisfaction,  unless  effort  is 
particularly stressful, i.e. UPI is not too negative. In fact: 
(8)  W*  =    Sf + PI*  (UPI +   Sf
PI)] +  PI PI*  [U +   Sf   V].  
This  case is  consistent with  evidence  on  the significance of employees’  work 
values for job satisfaction, which may be referred to the low or high level of  . Clark 
(1997) finds that those workers who regard pay as the most important or the second most 
                                                 
27 This reversed effect of very high levels of Y on P, which captures the idea that “everything has a price 
whatever high” has also been studied by Benabou & Tirole (2003). One can call this effect the ‘Indecent 
Proposal’ effect, from the well-known movie.   36 
important value also report less satisfaction with both pay and the work itself, whereas 
those who regard the work itself as the most important or the second most important 
value do not report less satisfaction in the two domains. Borzaga & Tortia (2006) find 
that those workers who are most interested in the wage also report less job satisfaction, 
whereas those who mostly regard work as an opportunity for self-fulfilment also report 
greater job satisfaction. 
Considering   >0  further  changes  the  effect  of  monetary  incentives  on  job 
satisfaction, in fact: 
(9)  W*Y  =    Sf
Y + PI*Y Sf
PI ]  
The effectiveness is reduced, i.e. W*Y <0, if PI*Y is sufficiently negative. 
Therefore,  introducing  the  route  in  the  job  performance/job  satisfaction  link 
where the psychological concept of intrinsic motivations can be defined, and effectively 
plays a role, allows us to obtain a number of interesting results for solution of the issues 
in Section 1. First, the conventional assumption that a worker’s effort has a negative 
effect on her/his utility is consistent with the evidence that s/he obtains satisfaction from 
working besides monetary rewards. This helps explain issue (III.1). 
Secondly, it is possible to explain why monetary incentives may have positive 
effects on job performance, as usually considered in economics, or may have negative 
effects,  as  especially  claimed  by  experimental  psychology.  This  helps  explain  issues 
(II.2).  Specifically,  the  effect  of  monetary  incentives  on  job  performance  crucially 
depends  on  extra-economic  and  extra-contractual  variables,  since  the  conditions  for 
crowding-out and crowding-in also depend on Z. This may account for the evidence on 
the  importance  of  selected  conditions,  like  participation  in  decisions  and  the  social 
climate  in  the  firm,  on  job  performance.  This  is  a  new  result  with  respect  to  the 
conventional economic theory. Instead of using economic incentives by relying on the 
opportunity cost of being fired, as appears in the numerator of (4), the employer can 
implement other actions to motivate and satisfy workers to improve performance (Sf
PIY  
in (7)). This helps explain issue (II.3). 
Thirdly,  when  studying  the  relationship  between  income  and  job  satisfaction, 
consideration  of  Z  becomes  important  both  directly  through  the  U-function  and  Sf-
function (Z may reduce fatigue and stress, thus reducing the negative impact of UPI), and   37 
through PI
Y (see (8)). Therefore, variation in the Z-variables, over time or sectionally, 
may account for an important portion of the variation of W, with respect to variation of 
Y. This may help explain issue (I).  
In particular, firms’ policies to improve performance by using Z-variables, like 
workers’ involvement in more knowledge-based tasks (see HPWP in section 3.3), may 
have positive effects on their job satisfaction, but only if effort does not become too 
stressful. Formally, the possibility that the effects on job performance are positive, i.e. 
PI
Z>0, but negative on job satisfaction can be accounted for by the necessary condition 




ZUPI. This condition becomes possible when PI 
is great, and hence UP very negative. The condition of having perverse effects on job 
satisfaction due to monetary incentives, which are also used in the HPWP package, is 






  Conclusions 
 
Recent  econometric  research  on  job  satisfaction  and  some  lines  of  inquiry  in 
psychology have produced empirical results which challenge some tenets of conventional 
economic  theory,  like  the  greater  positive effect of  economic  incentives  on  both  job 
performance and job satisfaction, and the disutility to workers of working hard. This 
paper has conducted a critical survey of those empirical results, and, on that basis, has 
suggested  an  economic  framework  in  which  to  reconcile  evidence  with  theory,  and 
economics with organisational psychology. In particular, the psychological concept of 
intrinsic motivations has been found to be especially powerful if properly introduced into 
the economic framework. 
The main recommendation for future research on this topic is that the disciplinary 
horizon should be extended in order to avoid the traps of biased partial correlations, 
especially because variables in the psychological dimension may be omitted, and because 
new interdependent links may arise. Extending the horizon obviously makes the picture 
more complex, but it may also provide suggestions on how to handle the most serious 
problems of this literature, namely those of causation and endogeneity. 
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Appendix 
 
Synoptic table of empirical literature on job satisfaction (after 1990) 
Reference  Theme  Sample  Data set 
Antonioli et al. 
(2008) 
Innovations, ICT and 
working conditions 
192 manufacturing 
firms; balance sheet 
data for 1998-2004 





altruism and job 
satisfaction 
3201 employees from 
11 different cities 
30 Mexican companies 
Bailey et al 
(2001) 
HPWP, discretionary 
effort, contingent pay 
4109 workers in   Three industries: apparel, steel 
and medical electronics detailed 




supervisors, and middle 
managers 
Interviews in a large 
telecommunications company 
Bauer (2004)  HPWO and job 
satisfaction 
15 EU member states  European Survey on Working 
Conditions in 2000 





28237 employees in 
2191 workplaces in 
1997/1998 
British Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey of 1998 
Benz (2005)  Non-profit vs. for-
profit wage 
American and British 
employees 
American National Longitudinal 
Study of Youth 1979-2000, BHPS 
1991-1999 
Bilimoria et al 
(2006) 
Gender   579 faculty members  University-wide survey in 2004 








EQW National Employers Survey 




Decline in job 
satisfaction 
US and European 
workers 





Social relations in the 
workplace 
2066 workers, 266 
managers 
1998 survey on the Italian social 
services sector  
Borzaga & 
Tortia (2006) 
Job satisfaction and 
loyalty 
2066 workers  1998 survey on the Italian social 
services sector  
Brown & 
McIntosh (1998) 
Determinants of job 
satisfaction 
1000 workers at 50 
sites 
1996-1997 survey on three 
national companies: a 
supermarket chain, a hotel group 
and a quick service restaurant 
chain 





19050 employees in all 
sectors of economy 
excluding agriculture 
British Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey In 1998 
Bryson et al. 
(2005) 
Unionization  17832 employees in all 
sectors of activity, 
except agriculture 
British  Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey in 1998 
Cappelli & 
Shererer (1988) 
Satisfaction with pay 
and job 
579 employees in 







Job autonomy, effort 
and job performances 
store managers and 
supervisors  
188 supermarkets of U.S.,  
(continue)  39 
 






2,611 workers and 445 
full-time workers in 
non-unionized 
companies 
Japanese electrical, electronic and 
information industries in the 
Union Denki Rengo 
Clark (1996)   Level of education, 
working hours 
5000 employees  British Household Panel Survey 
in 1991 
Clark (1997)  Career, male-female 
gaps 
5000 employees  British Household Panel Survey 
in 1991 
Clark (1999)  Equity and reference 
group, psychological 
perceptions 
5000 employees  British Household Panel Survey 
in 1991 
Clark (2005)  Job values and 
outcomes 
About 11000 
employees (5348 in 
1989 and 5378 in 1997) 
1989- 1997 Work Orientations 
Module of the International Social 











Low paid-high paid job 
gap 
14 EU members  ECHP (1994-2001), 
GSOEP et PSELL 





245 employees in 13 
firms 
Large firms in information 
technology departments in U.S. 
Florit & Vila 
Lladosa (2007) 
Direct and indirect 
impact of education 
4000 employees  Spanish Household Survey Panel 
(SHPS) in 1998 
Gazioglu & 
Tansel (2006) 
Working hours  British employees  Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey, 1997 
Ghinetti (2007)  Private-public 
satisfaction gap 
Italian employees  1995 Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth 









Workload, health  1796 employed people  General Social Survey 2002 and 
Quality of Working Life 2002 
Green & Gallie 
(2002) 
Mental well-being and 
its decline 
UK  Skills Survey of 2001 
Green & 
Tsitsianis (2005) 
Decline in job 
satisfaction 
UK and Germany  ECHP, BHPS (1991-2002); 
GOES (1985-2002); Employment 






539 observations in 
1978 and 1049 
observations in 1996 
National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Men and the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth in 
1978, 1988 and 1996 





954 employees from 10 
organizations 
5 service sector in Philippines 
Helliwell & 
Huang (2005) 




Equality, Security, and 
Community survey, Canada, wave 
2002-2003 
Hersch (1991)  Education, over-
qualification 
637 employees  Eugene, Oregon area in 1986, 
manufacturing and warehouse 
firms 
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Huang & van de 
Vliert (2002) 
Intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards 
8506 full-time 
employees in 19 
countries; 129,087 
employees in a 
multinational company 
International Social Survey 
Program in 1997 and 






Case studies and 
national cross-
industries studies for a 
total of 3452 firms 
US business 
Kaiser (2002)  Gender  About 1000 
interviewees per 
member-state 
The European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) for 








employees aged 15-64, 
interviewed in 2003 
The Quality of Work Life Survey 





152 senior managers  Manufacturing organizations in 
Singapore 
Long (2005)  Gender  13 969 full- and part-
time workers over the 
age of 18 years 
Wave 1 of the HILDA survey - 
Melbourne in 2001 
Meng (1990)  Members attitudes, 
unionization 
Random choice of 
members of Canadian 
unions  
Canadian unions 




417 subordinates and 
391 supervisors 
10 strategic business units 
interviewed in 1990 
Origo & Pagani 
(2006) 
Functional, numerical 
and time flexibility 
1000 interviews per 
member-state  
2001 Special Eurobarometer  
Rowden (2002)  Workplace learning, 
organizational size 
794 employees in 
twelve companies, 
mainly manufacturing 




sector, job quality 
Country samples in the 
15-EU 
European Community Household 
Panel in 1995-2000, European 
Labour Force Survey 2000 
Skalli et al. 
(2007) 
Determinants of job 
satisfaction and of each 
facet 





Gender  6110 individuals (UK)  1986 Social and Economic Life 
Initiative Survey (ESRC) 
Soonhee (2002)  Participative processes, 
supervisory 
communication 
1576 employees in 
different departments 
(from airport to social 
services) 





Determinants of job 
satisfaction 
full- and part-time 
workers in 21 countries 
ISSP 1997 
Stroh et al. 
(1994) 
Management, gender,   615 managers 
participating to two 
surveys in 1989 and 
1991 
Managers of 20 companies in 
different industries (hospital, 
communication, manufacturing) 
Thoms et al. 
(2002) 
Workers’ perception of 
accountability 
275 employers in three 
manufacturing plants 
Internal survey in Midwest 
Tortia (2008)  Fairness in non-profit 
and for-profit firms 
2066 workers, 266 
managers 
1998 survey on the Italian social 
services sector 
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Tsang et al. 
(1991) 
Surplus education  1500 Workers in the 
USA 
1969 Survey on Working 
Conditions and 1973/77 Quality 
of Employment Surveys 
Valentini (2005)  Personal condition of 
workers 




Education, aspects of 
the job 
5000 adults aged 
between 16-64 working 
at least 15 hours per 
week 




Synoptic table of empirical literature on job performance (after 1990) 






features of firms 
199 manufacturing 
firms 
Big-sized manufacturing firms in 










Interviewees with managers and 
workers in steel, apparel and 
medical electronics sectors 
Baard (2002)  Autonomy, 
competence 
relatedness 
495 employees  Field study in a major 
investment banking firm 
Barkema (1995)  Regulation and 
control 
116 managers  Medium-sized Dutch firms in 
1985 




193 and 143 branches, 
2245 and 1439 workers 
in 1994 and 1996 
Branches of a large New York 
metropolitan bank 
Becker & Huselid 
(1992) 
Tournaments  Panel of 29 auto-racing   Data collected in the National 








firms from 1994 and 
1997 
Survey on the Manufacturing 
sector in US 
Cristini et al. 
(2003)  
Workplace practices  100 firms  cross-section questionnaires and 
longitudinal balance sheets in 
Italy, Period 1991-1999 
Cristini (2007)  Working conditions, 
job security, 
teamworking, HPWP, 
and job satisfaction 
3605 employees  OAC (organization, learning and 
competencies), in Italy, designed 
by ISFOL in 2004 
Drago & Garvey 
(1998) 
Promotion, profit-
sharing and effort 
839 employees  1998 survey on non-supervisory 
employees in 23 workplaces in 
Australia 
Freeman (2000)  Employee 
involvement, 
production and 
financial outcomes  
273 firms in the USA  1993 mail survey of firms of the 








8000 establishments  Survey of Employer Provided 
Training 





time, happiness and 
job satisfaction 
US workers  2002 General Social Survey 
(GSS) Quality of Working Life 
(QWL) 
Harley (2002)  Performance-related 
pay, communication, 
training, team work 
4000 employees  Australian Workplace
 Industrial 
Relations Survey 1995 






60 automotive supplier 
plants 
Survey data collected in 1993 
and data on employment by the 
1999 Elm Guide 
Huselid (1997)  HPWP, effectiveness, 
alignment 
702 American workers  Sampling frame of all publicly-
help domestic firms woth more 
than 100 employees 
Ilardi et al. (1993)  Mental health  117 workers  Shoe factory in New York 
Janod & Saint-
Martin (2004) 
Work reorganization  2404 French 
manufacturing firms in 
1995 and 1999 
Data from Changements 
Organisa-tionnels et 







employees aged 15-64, 
interviewed in 2003 
The Quality of Work Life 
Survey 
Kuvaas (2006)  Different pay 
administration 
634 employees  Data on two business units in a 
Norwegian company 
Lazear (1996)  Monetary incentives, 
selection and effort 
29837 observations  Safelite Glass Corporation 
survey in Ohio during 1994-
1995 




firms in Bergamo from 
1990 to 1999 
100 firms 
Minkler (2002)  Work motivations, 
self-reported effort 
1005 workers  National telephone survey in 
2000 





senior managers in each 
of the  100 
organisations 
Sheffield Effectiveness 
Programme, from 1991 to 2000 
in 100 manufacturing British 
companies 




258 teachers  Survey of 50 Spanish secondary 
schools 
Tsang et al. (1991)  Surplus schooling  1500 working 
Americans 
1969 Survey of working 
conditions, Quality of 
employment surveys in 1973-77 
Valentini (2005)  Incentives  904 subjects  Research on Working in Britain, 
2000 
 
Empirical literature on the relation between job satisfaction and performances  (after 
1990) 
Reference  Theme  Sample  Data set 





380 direct sales-people  a company selling door-to-door 
throughout the United States 
Christen et al. 
(2006) 
Work effort, job 
performance and job 
satisfaction 
177 store managers  U.S. grocery retailer with more 
than 200 supermarkets. 
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Clark & Oswald 
(1996) 




5000 employees  British Household Panel Survey 
in 1991 
Ghinetti (2007)  Satisfaction and 
performances in 
private and public 
organizat.  
Italian employees  1995 Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth 
Green & Gallie 
(2002) 
Mental well-being, 
job satisfaction and 
performances 
UK  Skills Survey of 2001 
Green & Tsitsianis 
(2005) 
Job satisfaction and 
performances 
UK and Germany  ECHP, BHPS (1991-2002); 
GOES (1985-2002); Employment 
in Britain 1992, 2001 
Skills Survey 




performances and job 
satisfaction 
122 policies officers  Partecipants recruited in all police 






6110 individuals (UK)  1986 Social and Economic Life 
Initiative Survey (ESRC) 
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